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ABSTRACT
SPILLOVERS BETWEEN SKILLED AND LOW SKILLED LABOR
MIGRATION IN A MULTI-REGIONAL SETTING
O¨MER FARUK KORU
Economics, M.A. Thesis, 2015
Thesis Supervisor: Mehmet Barlo
Keywords: Migration, labor movement, skilled labor, migration policies
We analyze spillover effects arising due to movements of skilled and low skilled labor in
a static multi-regional model featuring three factors of production: capital, labor, and land
(an immobile factor). While capital is perfectly mobile, labor from one region can migrate
to another with some origin-destination specific probability (induced by the associated
immigration policies) after incurring fixed costs and skill specific efficiency losses both
of which are determined by the origin and destination. In this setting, we characterize not
only competitive equilibrium allocations of factors of production but also the associated
migration levels. Furthermore, we show that policies of host regions favoring skilled
labor from one particular region may trigger movements of low skilled labor from other
regions even when all the other parameters, including those concerning low skilled labor
movement costs, remain the same.
v
O¨ZET
C¸OK BO¨LGELI˙ MODELDE NI˙TELI˙KLI˙ VE VASIFSIZ I˙S¸C¸I˙
GO¨C¸U¨NU¨N KARS¸ILIKLI ETKI˙LES¸I˙MI˙
O¨MER FARUK KORU
Ekonomi,Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2015
Tez Danıs¸manı: Mehmet Barlo
Anahtar Kelimeler: Go¨c¸, is¸c¸i hareketi, nitelikli is¸c¸i, go¨c¸ politikaları
Bu tezde, c¸ok bo¨lgeli statik bir model o¨nerilmekte ve bu modeli kullanarak nitelikli ve
vasıfsız is¸c¸i go¨c¸lerinin birbiri u¨zerine yayılma etkisi incelemektedir. Modelde, u¨c¸ u¨retim
fakto¨ru¨ bulunmaktadır: sermaye, is¸c¸i ve toprak (hareketsiz fakto¨r). Sermaye hareketini
engelleyen hic¸ bir engel yok iken, is¸c¸iler bulundukları bo¨lgeden bas¸ka bir bo¨lgeye go¨c¸
etmeleri, bas¸langıc¸ ve varıs¸ noktasına dayalı bir olasılıg˘a bag˘lıdır. Aynı zamanda, is¸c¸iler
go¨c¸ sonrası bas¸langıc¸ ve varıs¸ noktasına dayalı verimlilik kaybına ug˘ramakta ve sabit bir
masraf o¨deme zorundadırlar. Bo¨yle bir durumda, u¨retim fakto¨rlerinin rekabetc¸i dengedeki
dag˘ılımları ve ilgili go¨c¸ seviyeleri belirlenmektedir. Bu c¸alıs¸mada go¨sterilmis¸tir ki go¨c¸
kabul eden bo¨lgelerin belirli bir bo¨geden nitelikli is¸c¸i go¨c¸u¨nu¨ kolaylas¸tıtmak ic¸in yaptıklari
politika deg˘is¸iklikleri, bas¸ka bir bo¨lgeden, bu bo¨lgedeki vasıfsız is¸c¸ileri ilgilendiren parame-
treler aynı kalsa dahi, vasıfsız is¸c¸i go¨c¸u¨nu¨ tetikleyebilmektedir.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
An important question in economics concerns the labor market impact of immigration.
Even though migrants might seem as burden on natives, it might be that in some cases
they may be the accelerator of the future growth of the countries. In this regard, by aiming
to increase the welfare of their citizens, countries search for immigration policies that
maximize their economic benefits. In this thesis, we analyze the economic implications
of two such policies: integration of migrants to labor market and visa granting policies.
On the negative side, immigrants bring about adverse effects on native workers:
increase in the immigration lead to expand in the labor supply, which in return decreases
the price of labor, i.e. wages. Also, immigrants raise the cost of public services; because
the demand for public education, health, transportation, etc. will be increased. Since
these costs are paid by the citizens of the host country, immigrants may aggravate the
tax burden on natives. These two factors are the main reasons for natives to be against
migration (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Mayda & Facchini, 2006).
In contrast, the public (of the host country) supports skilled migration much more
than the migration of low skilled workers (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Facchini &
Mayda, 2012). This is because the benefit from skilled migrants appear to be higher
than its costs; hence, skilled labor migration provides the host country with a positive
immigration surplus.
Firstly, skilled migrants have positive externalities on other workers. Since migra-
tion is non-random, it is expected that people who want to migrate are the more able
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people. This so called self-selection effect (Borjas, 1987) leads to increase in efficiency.
Indeed, Peri (2012) shows that migration improves the total factor productivity of the host
country. One explanation is that with skilled migrants being more concentrated in science
and engineering and them being more able thanks to self-selection lead to boost innova-
tion in the host country. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) demonstrate that a percentage
expansion in post-college immigrants has two times higher impact on per capita patent
numbers than the one percentage post college native expansion. These aspects of skilled
migrants positively affect the long run growth of the host country.
Secondly, more educated people are less likely to use public services and pay
more taxes. Hence, their benefit is higher than their cost for governments. Storesletten
(2000) calculates that net present value of representative high skilled migrant as $96,000;
whereas this figure is $− 2,000 and $− 36,000 for the medium and the low skilled mi-
grant, respectively.
Importance of human capital for growth, positive externalities on native workers,
and increases in tax revenues result in governments to want to attract high skilled immi-
grants (Aydemir, 2013; Kapur & McHale, 2005). Moreover, ageing population and the
slow growth rate of labor force in rich countries raises the popularity of attractiveness of
skilled migrants (Ferrer, Picot, & Riddell, 2014). By adopting policies that attract the
skilled persons to migrate, countries might ameliorate their welfare.
In this regard, some countries such as Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Ger-
many, adopted admission policies that attract high skilled migrants. One possible way to
do this is giving priority to the high educated people. While granting visas, a college grad-
uate should have higher acceptance rate than a high school drop-out. Secondly, countries
may change the nation-mix of the migrants. By accepting migrants from countries with
higher (average) level of education, they would broaden the portion of the high skilled
labor in the migrants.
Another aspect of skilled migration is the labor market integration. Although by
admission policies high skilled migrants might be attracted, there might be imperfect skill
transferability due to differences in culture, language, labor market structures. These
differences may undermine the efficiency of the migrants which results in lower wages.
A branch of studies shows that newly arrived immigrants earn lower wages than natives
(Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005; Borjas, 1985; Card, 2005; Ferrer et al., 2014). It is stated
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that this wage gap narrows down in time thanks to the integration of the migrants into
the labor market. Hence, an immigrant considers this efficiency loss and wants to move
where this loss is minimum.
Therefore, there exist two policy channels to attract high skilled immigrants. First is
to favor high educated people when granting visas and work permits, and the second is to
expedite and improve the associated labor market integration. While the first of these two
policies is generally implemented by designing visa granting policies to various countries
and skill levels accordingly; the second involves implementing policies calling for open-
ing courses that teaches migrants language and cultural aspects in order to expedite and
improve intehration into the host country. For example, Britain reached the cap on the
visas that granted to high skilled labor (Travis, 2015). In order them to enlarge the high
skilled labor base, they need to change the visa granting scheme. In Germany, on the
other hand, the supply of language courses for migrants far below than the demand for
them (Integration Courses, 2010, 25 October). Consequently, this discourages skill labor
from migrating to Germany. Hence, they need to adapt integration courses to meet the
demand.
A recent and related literature focuses on the potential gains from the elimination of
the barriers to labor movements. Even though the first of such simulations was conducted
in 1984, this analysis has attracted significant attention only in 2000’s. In their inspi-
rational paper, Hamilton and Whalley (1984) estimates the growth in the world output.
20 years later, J. W. Moses and Letnes (2004) replicates their study with a new dataset
and later they compare the alternative liberalization policies to available migration data
and calculate the possible per migrant gains (2005). Main argument of these studies is
that when the barriers to labor movement are eliminated, people would move to regions
where wages are higher. The equilibrium distribution of the labor force should be such
that wages in all of the regions should be equalized. So, they found the distribution of
labor force across regions that equalize the marginal productivity of labor is equalized ev-
erywhere and then calculate the outputs in each region in this new labor force distribution.
Iregui (2003) develops a model where there exist two types of labor (skilled and unskilled)
and each country produces one distinct commodity good, which enable them to consider
the international trade. All of these studies examine a static model. Klein and Ventura
(2007, 2009) and Delogu, Docquier, and Machado (2014) uses dynamic models to in-
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vestigate the efficiency gains from elimination of restriction on labor movement. Klein
and Ventura (2007) considers the efficient distribution of labor force across two region:
rich and poor. Correspondingly, they solve the social planner problem and analyze the
effect of TFP differences between regions, which accused to bring about the variations in
labor movements. In their 2009 paper, Klein and Ventura examine the competitive market
equilibrium in a three factor (capital, land, labor) growth model while labor consists of
only one type. The effect of liberalization on the education level and fertility decision of
individuals analyzed by Delogu et al. (2014). As Clemens (2011) refers these findings
as “Trillion Dollar bills on the side-walk”; all of these studies find substantial gain from
labor market liberalization. The literature suggests that reducing the barriers to move-
ment would increase the GDP of world from 20% to 122%. In a recent study, Giovanni,
Levchenko, and Ortega (2015) looking at the opposite direction, analyze the possible im-
pact of a full restriction of migration. Their model includes the effect of remittances
and international trade. They estimated that observed level of migration today account
for 10% increase in the welfare of individuals, comparing the counter factual scenario in
which there were no migration.
The efficiency loss of migrants is examined in some of these studies, however they
assumed that efficiency losses are independent of host and source countries (Klein &
Ventura, 2007, 2009; Iregui, 2003; Giovanni et al., 2015). Even though some of them
considers heterogeneous labor (Klein & Ventura, 2007; Giovanni et al., 2015; Delogu et
al., 2014), only Iregui (2003) regards the situation in which only skilled labor can migrate.
Moreover, apart from Iregui (2003), none of the other studies focus on bilateral migration
policies, they take only the global liberalization into consideration. However, bilateral
agreements are more possible in reality. For example, with bilateral agreements, Ger-
many accepted guest workers from Italy, Turkey and Greece in 1960s. Furthermore, these
studies are reluctant to emphasize the size of the movements in such scenarios (Borjas,
2015). Klein and Ventura (2009) state that 99% of the population in the poor countries
are supposed to migrate to rich countries in the equilibrium. Possible impact of huge
movements does not discussed in detail even though this amount of movement can bring
about big social problems.
In this paper, we analyze spillover effects between movements of skilled and low
skilled labor in a static multi-country framework under competitive equilibrium featuring
4
three factors of production: capital, labor, and land. In our setting capital is freely mobile,
land is immobile and labor, composed of skilled and low skilled workers, is restricted in
mobility via skill specific visa policies and efficiency losses. It turns out that the design
of policies has to be carefully conducted. This is because “intuitive” policies aiming to
attract high skilled migrants from one country, due to these spillover effects may lead to
reverse the desired effects, by triggering the movement of low skilled labor from another
country.
In our model, every one of the regions possesses a continuum of agents. An agent
initially located in one region possesses initial endowments of capital, land and labor,
where his labor may be of one of the following two types: high skilled or low skilled.
Freely mobile capital implies that each agent, which can be located in any regions
initially, can freely invest in any one of the regions he desires.
On the other hand, restricted labor mobility is modeled as follows. When an agent
initially located in a region aims to move to another country, first he faces a probability
of acceptance. This probability, specific to origin-destination and the skill type under
analysis, determines the likelihood with which this agent’s attempt would be successful.
Notice that, therefore, there is a probability that an agent cannot move even when he
wishes to migrate to another country. Secondly, when he migrates to another country, the
agent in question will lose some of his efficiency due to the imperfect skill transferability.
This corresponding efficiency loss depends on the origin and the destination and the skill
type of the agent. The third restriction regarding labor mobility involves a (real) fixed cost
of moving which is also related to the origin and the destination and the skill type of the
migrating agent.
The third factor of production, land, is owned by the agents. Clearly, this production
factor is not mobile. As we employ the notion of competitive equilibrium in the current
study, we do not model the trade of (buying/selling) land. Indeed, when an agent moves
from one country to another, he keeps his land in the country of origin and collects the
resulting rents without any frictions.
Each county produces a homogeneous consumption good using the same production
function with different total factor productivity figures across countries. An important,
yet standard, restriction employed in the current study concerns the inability of firms
to delegate production to other countries. While the trade of consumption good across
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regions is not restricted, the delegation of production to other locations is not allowed.
The production in a given country is as in Borjas (2003) and uses the following two
stage constant elasticity of substitution production function adopting the convention that
natives and immigrants have the same skill level and are perfect substitutes (of course,
up to the associated efficiency losses), which is consistent with the findings of Borjas,
Grogger, and Hanson (2012). In the first stage labor in each skill level is aggregated into
the efficiency unit. Then, in the second stage, using the resulting aggregated efficiency
labor unit, we have the production function of a county in standard constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas form.
In competitive equilibrium, the prices of production factors, interest rates and wages
and rent for land are given by their corresponding marginal productivity.
As a consequence, the best responses of an individual initially located in one of
the countries, would call for that agent attempting migration to another country if the
(expected) gains from migration exceeds the costs.
As in other standard macroeconomics models, here the level of prices of production
factors in a country affects the amount of production factors in that country. E.g. wages
to low skilled (high skilled) labor in a country affect the mass of low skilled (high skilled,
respectively) labor force in the same country.
However, in our model the story does not end there: It is essential to notice that the
marginal productivity of a production factor in a given country is affected by the mass of
other production factors in the same country. E.g. the wages to skilled labor (low skilled)
force in a country is affected by the amount of low skilled (skilled, respectively) labor
force in the same country. Combining this observation with the one given in the previous
paragraph constitutes precisely the origin of the spillover effects between skilled labor
and unskilled labor that the current study analyzes. Also the model involving multiple
regions implies that the problem at hand is beyond the identification of a fixed point with
two countries.
In this setting, we define and identify the competitive (Walras) equilibrium and
analyze the resulting implications on the distribution of skilled and low skilled labor and
capital across countries. This, in turn, is used to analyze welfare implications across
countries.
We show that the spillover effects between skilled labor and unskilled labor are
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significant in competitive equilibrium. To that regard we present two examples both of
which are taken from the real-world.
In the first example, considering Germany integration policy, we analyze the effect
of alleviating efficiency losses concerning high skilled labor from only one country. We
show that a policy change designed to alleviate efficiency losses for high skilled workers
from Poland, triggers a migration of low skilled labor from Czech Republic. This example
also depicts the so-called network effect: Even though there are no changes concerning
policies and frictions between Germany and Czech Republic, the reduction of frictions
between Germany and Poland regarding only the skilled labor triggers a wave of migration
of low skilled labor from Czech Republic.
In our second example, another three country setting involving the real-world data,
the situation between Canada and Mexico and the USA is analyzed. We show that by
allowing some low skilled labor from Mexico to come and work in the USA initiates high
skilled labor from Canada to migrate to the US as well even if this migration were to
involve a fixed cost.
This paper is organized as followed: in the second chapter we present the model
and in the third we provide the definition of competitive equilibrium. Forth chapter dis-
plays our simulation results concerning the reduction of efficiency losses using data from
Germany and Poland and Czech Republic. The fifth chapter provides our results from
simulations of visa policy relief using the US and Canada and Mexico data. In the sixth
chapter we conclude.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MODEL
Let N = {1, . . . ,n}, n ∈ N, denote the set of nodes (regions or locations).
Ti, a non-empty convex and compact subset of R for each i ∈ N, denotes the set of
agents initially located in node i. Each agent t ∈ Ti, is endowed with k¯i(t) ∈ R+ amounts
of capital and f¯i(t)∈R+ amounts of land, in turn delivering functions k¯i : Ti→R+ and f¯i :
Ti→R+ which are assumed to be bounded and measurable. Each t ∈ Ti has 1 (efficiency)
unit endowment of either of the following two types of labor: high skilled or low skilled,
denoted by s ∈ {`,h}; ` for low skilled and h for high skilled. For any given t ∈ Ti, we let
st ∈ {`,h} be the type of labor agent t has.
Therefore, each node i ∈ N possesses four types of mass: (i) mass of low skilled
labor L¯i =
∫
t∈Ti 1{st=`}dt; (ii) mass of high skilled labor H¯i =
∫
t∈Ti 1{st=h}dt; (iii) mass of
capital K¯i =
∫
t∈Ti k¯i(t)dt; (iv) and mass of land F¯i =
∫
t∈Ti f¯i(t)dt. Notice that the definition
of the index function and k¯i : Ti→ R+ and f¯i : Ti→ R+ being bounded and measurable
imply that L¯i, H¯i, K¯i, F¯i ∈ R+.
In our model, capital is freely mobile and land is immobile. The mobility of labor,
on the other hand, is restricted and involves three types of frictions: (i) efficiency losses;
(ii) regions’ migration policies; and (iii) fixed costs of migration. Let Csi j ∈ [0,1] denote
the efficiency unit of labor of an agent initially located in region i having a skill level s
and working in region j. In other words, (1− csi j) identifies the efficiency loss of labor of
type s when he/she migrates from i to j. Regions migration policies determine pisi j ∈ [0,1],
the probability of workers with skill level s from region i being accepted by region j. This
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parameter captures visa policies of regions and higher levels mean that regions are more
open for labor movements. Finally, Msi j ≥ 0 is the fixed cost of migration (in real terms)
of an agent from region i having labor of type s migrating to region j. Notice that all of
these frictions depend on the host and source regions and skill levels.
Each location involves the production of the homogeneous consumption good. In-
deed, every location has the same production function with different total factory pro-
ductivity figures across regions. An important, yet standard, restriction employed in the
current study concerns the inability of firms to delegate production to other regions. While
the trade of consumption good across regions is not restricted, the delegation of produc-
tion to other locations is not allowed.
The production in a given region is modeled following Borjas (2003) 1. We use a
two stage constant elasticity of substitution production function and assume that natives
and immigrants having the same skill level are perfect substitutes (up to the associated
efficiency losses), which is consistent with the findings of Borjas et al. (2012).
In the first stage labor in each skill level is aggregated into the efficiency unit. Let
Qi be the efficiency unit of labor in region i and defined by
Qi(`i,hi) = (α`
ρ
i +(1−α)hρi )1/ρ (2.1)
where ρ = 1−1/σ`h and σ`h is the elasticity of substitution between low skilled and high
skilled labor and α is the efficiency parameter and ρ captures the substitution between
high skilled and low skilled labor.
In the second stage, using the above given aggregated efficiency labor unit, we have
the production function of location i in constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas form:
Yi(`i,hi,Ki,Fi) = AiQi(`i,hi)ηKλi F
1−λ−η
i
where Yi is the total output and Ai the TFP of region i, and η ,λ ∈ (0,1) are such that
η +λ < 1. Consequently, given wages wsi of location i for skill level s and r
f
i the rental
rate of land in i and rki the interest rate of capital in region i, the profit of a firm located in
1Borjas (2003) uses three level CES framework, though here we assume that natives and immigrants are
perfect substitute for any given skill level. Hence, the third stage is simple summation.
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i is given by:
Yi(`i,hi,Ki,Fi)−w`i `i−whi hi− rki Ki− r fi Fi, (2.2)
While the current presentation involves these parameters being constant across re-
gions (as is done in other related studies), generalizing our model by weakening this
aspect is an easy exercise.
Before presenting our equilibrium concept, the notion of competitive equilibrium
applied to the current setting, we wish to discuss agents’ migration decisions.
Given wages ws = (wsj) j∈N for skill level s ∈ {`,h} and r f = (r fj )i∈N and rk =
(rkj) j∈N the interest rate profile where each component corresponds to the interest rate of
capital in the associated region, an agent initially located in region i, t ∈ Ti, with skill level
s ∈ {`,h} earns the following real term (in consumption goods) if he/she were to decide
to stay in i
wsi + r
k ·ki(t)+ r fi f¯i(t), (2.3)
where ki(t) : Ti→Rn+ describes the investment behavior of t ∈ Ti while ki j(t) ∈R+ iden-
tifies his/her investment to region j and feasibility requires ki j(t) ∈ [0, k¯i(t)] for all j and
∑ j ki j(t) ≤ k¯i(t). On the other hand, if he/she were to choose to migrate to region j 6= i,
then he/she earns the real term given by
pisi j
(
wsj + r
k ·ki(t)+ r fi f¯i(t)−Msi j
)
+(1−pisi j)
(
wsi + r
k ·ki(t)+ r fi f¯i(t)
)
. (2.4)
Observe that we do not allow agents to allocate some portions of their labor to different
locations and restrict attention to situations where they can work and reside in only one
region. On the other hand, agents can distribute their capital arbitrarily across regions and
collect a portfolio return of rk ·ki(t). It may be useful to point out that we do not allow
for short-sales. Moreover, agents keep getting the real return to their land (in their home
region) regardless of where they work/reside.
Hence an agent t ∈ Ti, when deciding whether or not to move to another region,
compares (2.3) with (2.4) for j 6= i. As a result, t ∈ Ti strictly prefers attempting to migrate
to region j 6= i if:
csi jw
s
j−pisi jMsi j > wi (2.5)
Therefore, t ∈ Ti best responding to the givens of the model implies that he/she
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would attempt to move to j∗ ∈ argmax j∈N{csti jwstj −pisti j Msti j} provided that condition (2.5)
holds for some j 6= i.
In what follows, the term θ si j denotes the mass of labor initially located in i and
having a labor type s that attempts to migrate from i to j, j 6= i.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we will provide the definition of equilibrium, the notion of competitive
equilibrium applied to the current setting.
Definition 1 Given ([Csi j], [pi
s
i j], [M
s
i j])i, j∈N;s∈{`,h} and (Ai)i∈N and k¯i : Ti → R+ and f¯i :
Ti → R, i ∈ N, and k¯i, f¯i both bounded and measurable, the profile [θ si j]i, j∈N , w`, wh,
rk,r f and (hi, `i,ki)i∈N is a competitive equilibrium if:
1. Agents’ Problem:
(a) If θ si j > 0 for i, j with i 6= j, then
(i.) either wsi = c
s
i jw
s
j−pisi jMi j,
(ii.) or wsi < c
s
i jw
s
j−pisi jMi j and θ si j =
(∫
t∈Ti 1{st=s}dt
)−∑k 6= j θ sik; and
(b) If wsi > c
s
i jw
s
j−pisi jMi j for i, j with i 6= j, then θ si j = 0; and
(c) ki : Ti→Rn is such that for all i∈N and t ∈Ti, (ki j(t)) j∈N ∈ argmax(κ j) j∈N ∑ j∈N rkjκ j
subject to κ j ∈ [0, k¯i(t)] for all j ∈ N and ∑ j∈N κ j ≤ k¯i(t).
2. Firm’s Problem:
(a) w`i = Aiηα`
ρ−1
i Q
η/ρ−1
i K
λ
i F
1−β−γ
i , for all i.
(b) whi = Aiη(1−α)hρ−1i Qη/ρ−1i Kλi F1−β−γi , for all i.
(c) rki = AiλK
λ−1
i Q
η
i F
1−η−λ
i , for all i.
(d) r fi = Ai(1−η−λ )Kλi Qηi F−η−λi , for all i.
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3. Feasibility:
(a) θ si j ≤
∫
t∈Ti 1{st=s}dt, for all i, j with i 6= j; and
(b) `i = L¯i+ ∑
j 6=i
c`jipi`jiθ `ji− ∑
j 6=i
pi`i jθ `i j, for all i; and
(c) hi = H¯i+ ∑
j 6=i
chjipi
h
jiθ
h
ji− ∑
j 6=i
pihi jθ
h
i j, for all i; and
(d) Ki = ∑ j
(∫
t∈Tj k ji(t)dt
)
, for all i; and
(e) Fi =
∫
t∈Ti f¯i(t)dt, for all i.
Following this definition, there are two important points:
Lemma 1 In every competitive equilibrium, returns to capital should be equal in each
region, i.e rki = r
k
j for all i, j ∈ N.
Proof. Notice that portfolio decision in agents’ problem is a linear problem. If this
equality does not hold, then there exist i ∈ N such that rki < rkj for some j, hence, no agent
would invest in i since the return is higher in j. But then Ki would be zero, which leads
the interest in region i to go infinity. This leads to contratiction.
Lemma 2 In every competitive equilibrium, θ si j > 0 implies θ
s
ji = 0, i, j ∈ N and i 6= j
Proof. From the agents’ proglem, θ si j > 0 implies w
s
i = c
s
i jw
s
j − pisi jMi j; hence c jiwsi −
pisi jM
s
ji < w j due to c
s
i j < 1 for all 1 6= j.
Our first lemma implies that what matters in competitive equilibrium is Ki, i ∈ N,
and ki : Ti → Rn can be chose arbitrarily as long as Ki = ∑ j
∫
t∈Tj ki j(t)dt. On the other
hand, second lemma says that the direction of migration is one way: if there exist a flow
of migrants from i to j in one skill level, there would be no migration flow from j to i
within that skill level.
3.1. Cobb-Douglas Aggregation of Skill Level
Now we will consider the Cobb-Douglas aggregation of skill levels, i.e we assume that
ρ = 0. In order to present a closed form solution, we also let Msi j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N and
s ∈ {`,h}.
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In this case, the production function is
Yi(`i,hi,Ki,Fi) = AiKλi `
β
i h
γ
i F
1−λ−γ−β
i (3.1)
By definition of competitive equilibrium, if θ `i j > 0 then:
` j =
[
ci j
(
A j
Ai
)(
k j
ki
)λ (h j
hi
)γ(Fj
Fi
)1−λ−β−γ] 11−β
`i (3.2)
Lemma 1 and marginal productivity condition in the competitive equilibrium im-
plies that capital distribution should satisfy:
K j
Ki
=
[(
A j
Ai
)(
` j
`i
)β (h j
hi
)γ(Fj
Fi
)1−λ−β−γ] 11−λ
(3.3)
for all i, j ∈ N. Plugging (3.3) into (3.2) leads to:
` j =
(
1
ci j
) λ−1
1−λ−β
[(
A j
Ai
)(
Fj
Fi
)1−γ−λ−β] 11−λ−β (h j
hi
) γ
1−λ−β
`i. (3.4)
In this equation, Ai,A j,ci j,Fi,Fj are constants. If there is no movement of high
skilled labor, then this condition says than low skilled labor stock at the equilibrium is
proportional between locations. The spillover effects come from (h j/hi)
γ
1−λ−β . Since
this is increasing in h j, this implies that higher the high skilled labor movement to j
independent of source region, higher the low skilled labor movement from i to j.
We can find a similar condition for high skilled labor movements as well: If θ si j > 0
then
h j =
(
1
ci j
) λ−1
1−λ−γ
[(
A j
Ai
)(
Fj
Fi
)1−γ−λ−β] 11−λ−γ (` j
`i
) β
1−λ−γ
hi. (3.5)
Therefore, gathering up the constant terms in equations (3.4) and (3.5) by the fol-
lowing
Φi, j =
[(
A j
Ai
)(
Fj
Fi
)1−γ−λ−β] 11−λ−β
,
enables us to present the resulting spillover effects in a closed form by rewriting equations
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(3.4) and (3.5) as follows:
` j
`i
=Φi, j
(
1
ci j
) λ−1
1−λ−β
(
h j
hi
) γ
1−λ−β
, and
h j
hi
=Φi, j
(
1
ci j
) λ−1
1−λ−γ
(
` j
`i
) β
1−λ−γ
.
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CHAPTER 4
ALLEVIATION OF EFFICIENCY LOSSES
In our model, we assume that people migrate to places providing higher real returns for
their labor. However, in order to use their human capital effectively, migrating agents
should adapt to the new environment. Clearly, a migrant would be disadvantaged against
the native of the same skill type, since the native is more accustomed to and knows the
ways of the environment they are to work in. This is called the efficiency loss of migration.
Hence, in the same skill group, immigrants earn lower wages than natives. But this wage
gap decreases over time (Borjas, 1985; Chiswick, 1978). One possible explanation for
this is that migrants get integrated into the labor market of the host country and as a
result they start using their human capital more efficiently. Decreasing the corresponding
efficiency losses, therefore, would give rise to higher return to human capital.
Language, for example, is an important barrier for migrants. In order to be efficient,
communication is important factor in order to understand the task. Aydemir and Skuterud
(2005) states that one third of the decrease in the migrant entry level wage can be at-
tributed to the change in migrants national mix and language abilities. Hence, language
proficiency is important for using human capital effectively.
Another human capital loss from migration might be that host country does not
recognize the qualifications. If degrees, certificates earned in foreign countries are not
accepted, then he simply is seen as non-graduate. So they might be recognized as low
skilled workers.
In this chapter, our aim is to understand the effect of policy changes regarding the
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alleviation of efficiency losses. Germany, Poland and Czech Republic provides a good
thought experiment for this purposes. First of all, these three countries are in the European
Union, which enable workers to freely move across borders. Therefore there is no effect
of visa policies. Secondly, in 2005 Germany passed new migration law. One of the
aim of this law is to fasten the integration process of migrants. In this regard, Germany
offered language courses both in basic level and occupational specific, accredited foreign
qualifications, and increased the services to introduce German system (Burkett & Haas,
2014).
In our simulation, we consider effect of such policy changes. We will assume that
in order to attract skilled labor from Poland, somehow, Germany implements policies that
decline the efficiency losses concerning the skilled labor from Poland coming to Germany.
As stated above, this may involve offering occupational or technical language courses for
the skilled Polish migrants. Moreover, there are no changes regarding migrants to Ger-
many from the Czech Republic (both skilled and low skilled) and low skilled migrants
from Poland. In what follows, we show that by only changing the efficiency loss param-
eter for skilled labor from Poland, a migration of low skilled labor from Czech Republic
to Germany is triggered.
4.1. Parametrization
The parameters we should adjust for the simulation are skilled and unskilled labor force,
capital stock, TFP level, elasticity of substitution and share parameter between skilled and
unskilled labor, efficiency loss for both skilled type in each country.
Labor force data is taken from the World Bank and skill composition is taken from
OECD (OECD, 2014). We identify skilled labor that has education at tertiary level. Ger-
many has the highest level of skilled labor, with 28%, then Poland and Czech Republic
with 25% and 19% respectively. It is assumed that total land in a given country is equal
to its population, thus per capita land is one in each region. Capital stocks are taken Penn
World Tables 8.1 (PWT) (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). All of these parameters are
normalized to Germany, and we present the other countries values as relative to Germany.
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Share parameter, α in the equation 2.1 is adjusted such that skill premium in Ger-
many, i.e whGER/w
`
GER mimics the observed level in OECD report (OECD, 2014). For
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, 1/(1−ρ) in the equation
2.1, we use the estimates of Borjas et al. (2012). They estimate elasticity of substitution in
the US between −0.326 and −0.62 with different specification. We took ρ = 1/3 which
corresponds to elasticity of substitution around −0.66.
For income shares, the values used by Klein and Ventura (2007) are used. So we
set share of capital as λ = 0.317, share of income as η = 632. We assume that these are
same across countries. Furthermore, efficiency loss for low skilled is set to 0.6 and for
high skilled is set to 0.8 for all destinations. Also we assume that there is no fixed costs
of moving.
The recent version of PWT gives the TFP level of countries relative to the US
(Inklaar & Timmer, 2013). We use them in our analysis with slightly change in the ob-
served values, without changing the order, in order to have more pronounced results. TFP
of Germany is increased to 0.97 from 0.8286, TFP of Czech Republic increased to 0.74
from 0.5916. Poland’s TFP taken as it is given by 0.8033.
4.2. Simulation
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows these parameters, and Panel B gives the equilibrium rate of
returns on labor, capital and land, and gives GDP of the countries. As it can be seen
Germany is the biggest economy, and both high and low skilled workers are better than
other places. But, this wage difference does not compensate the efficiency losses, hence
there is no migration in the initial situation.
In order to see the effect of the change in Germany’s integration policy, we decrease
the efficiency loss of Polish high skilled workers migrated to Germany, i.e increase chPG.
Initially, we assumed that chPG = 0.8. Suppose this figure is raised to 0.95. Since there is
no change for any parameter that affects Czech Republic, it would be expected that the
labor should stay there. However, Table 4.2 shows that not only high skill labor from
Poland is migrated, but also low skilled labor from Czech Republic migrated.
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Table 4.1: Efficiency Loss - Initial Equilibrium
Panel A: Edowments of Countries
Poland Czech Republic Germany
Low Skilled 0.340 0.106 0.720
High Skilled 0.113 0.025 0.280
Population 0.454 0.130 1.000
Capital Stock 0.299 0.073 0.880
Land 0.454 0.130 1.000
TFP 0.803 0.740 0.970
Panel B: Returns in the Equilibrium
Poland Czech Republic Germany
Wage 0.241 0.198 0.329
Compensation 0.401 0.416 0.494
Return on Land 0.023 0.019 0.030
Return on Capital 0.214 0.214 0.214
GDP 0.202 0.049 0.594
Table 4.2: Efficiency Loss - Simulation Results
Panel A: Distribution of Factors
Poland Czech Republic Germany
Low Skilled 0.340 0.100 0.724
High Skilled 0.087 0.025 0.305
Population 0.427 0.124 1.032
Capital Stock 0.274 0.070 0.907
Land 0.427 0.124 1.029
TFP 0.803 0.740 0.970
Panel B: Returns in the Equilibrium
Poland Czech Republic Germany
Wage 0.228 0.201 0.335
Compensation 0.452 0.406 0.476
RentLand 0.021 0.019 0.031
RentCap 0.214 0.214 0.214
GDP 0.185 0.048 0.613
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Around 6% of the low skilled labor in the Czech Republic migrates in the equilib-
rium thanks to newly arrived Polish high skilled migrants. 18.75% reduction in efficiency
loss induce to migration of 23% the skill labor in the Poland, and 6% of low skilled labor
in Czech Republic. The impact is huge. If we consider smaller decrease in efficiency loss,
suppose we set chPG = 0.85, then we see migration of 1.5% of low skilled labor in Czechs
and 7.6% of high skilled labor of Polish.
The cause of this spillover effect can be understood from Table 4.3. Wage rate
of low skilled labor in Germany increased by 2% even though there exist a low skilled
migrant flow. This is due to huge expansion in human capital by taking Poland high
skilled workers. Complementarity between skill groups leads to rise in wage rate, which
in turn stimulate the flow of Czechs.
When we look at the impact of this migration flow on the economic outcome, in
Germany, only high skilled worker is worse off: there exist a 4% cutback in skill compen-
sation rate. However, economy produces more output, GDP grows 3.23%, though there
is almost no change in per capita outcome. This is because growth in GDP is similar to
expansion in population. On the other hand, as a high skilled sending country, Poland
looses. Its output drops by 8.16%, and per capita impact is −2.52%. Only high skilled
workers in Poland are better off, since around one fourth of them left the country, which
makes high skilled worker scarcer. Similar to Poland, Czech Republic also shrinks. How-
ever, although its GDP shrunk, its GDP per capita improved around 1%. This might be
because of the enlargement in the skill composition in Czech Republic, which in turn
enlarges the average productivity in the country. World total output is expand by 0.11%.
World as a whole gain from this policy change.
Table 4.3: Efficiency Loss - % Changes
Poland Czech Republic Germany
Low Skilled 0.00% -5.74% 0.51%
High Skilled -23.20% 0.00% 8.93%
Capital Stock -8.27% -3.74% 3.12%
Population -5.80% -4.65% 3.24%
GDP -8.16% -3.64% 3.23%
GDP percap -2.51% 1.06% 0.00%
Wage -5.32% 1.56% 1.69%
Compensation 12.90% -2.36% -3.62%
Ret. Land -8.16% -3.10% 4.32%
Ret. Capital 0.11% 0.11% 0.11%
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In the equilibrium, Germany did not gain anything in per capita term in spite of
increase in skilled population in the country to more than 30%. This inverse impact is due
to the indirect impact of this integration of Polish high skilled workers on the low skilled
workers. At the end low skilled Czechs also migrate to Germany.
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CHAPTER 5
VISA POLICIES
Visa granting policy is important in the determination of the skill composition of the
migrants. Which characteristics would be favored, how many visas would be given is
important decisions in this sense. By using these criteria, countries can choose the high
skilled labor from the migrant applicant’s pool. Also, they can provide special visa cate-
gories for particular skilled labor, such as H-1B visa of the US government issues. In the
end, countries may increase the proportion of the high skilled labor migrants.
Although countries use admission criteria favoring the high skilled migrants, the
outcome may not be as expected. Cobb-Clark (2000) finds that visa categories have little
importance on labor force participation; however immigrants selected for their skills have
higher rate of employment after a period of time in Australia. Even though Canada seems
to attract more high skilled migrants than the US, some relate this to the particular na-
tional mix of the migrants. If Canada were to attract migrants from countries with higher
(average) level of education, then the overall skill level of migrants would be higher. In-
deed, according to Borjas (1993) and Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003), Canada
accepts migrants from higher educated regions, hence has more high skilled migrants due
to national-mix of the migrants. In contrast, Aydemir (2011) using Oaxaca decomposi-
tion shows that for any given source country, Canada admits more high educated people
than the US. Hence, either by changing the national-mix of migrants or by accepting high
skilled labor rather than the low skilled one from any given country, it might be possible
to enlarge the high skilled labor population.
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In order to capture these policies, we implement probability of admitting to a coun-
try as migrant parameter into the model. pisi j gives the probability of acceptance into the
region j who attempts to migrate from i in skill level s, where i, j ∈ N and s ∈ {`,h}. We
differentiate this probability across skill groups, which enable us to examine the policy
effect of favoring the high skilled labor migration rather than the low skilled labor migra-
tion. If pihi j is higher than pi
`
i j, then region j is favoring high skilled labor from region i and
high skilled labors have greater acceptance rate. We also allow this probability to depend
on origin-destination regions, which permit us to change the nation-mix of migrants for
any given region.
In this chapter, we consider the possible effect of reduction in the visa restrictions
for Mexican labors. First, as a baseline, we show the results of the model for observed real
data. Then, as an extreme case, the results for unrestricted migration policy for Mexicans
will be considered. Later, we show the effect of partial elimination of restrictions on this
labor movement.
5.1. Parametrization
We will use similar strategy with Germany example for parametrization. With the same
arguments, we set elasticity of substitution between skill groups such that ρ = 1/3, in-
come share of labor as η = 632 and income share of capital as λ = 0.317. In order to
mimic the relative income of skilled labor to unskilled, we set α as 0.314.
Skilled labor share of the workforce of the US, Canada and Mexico are 42%, 52%,
and 18% respectively (OECD, 2014). Again, land per capita assumed to be one in all
countries. Capital stock is taken from PWT and turned into relative to the US (Feenstra
et al., 2015).
TFP levels also taken from PWT. Corresponding figures for the US is 1, for Canada
it is 0.879, and for Mexico it is 0.725. Efficiency loss for low skilled is 0.6 and it is 0.8
for high skilled labor independent of destination and origin.
In this simulation, the important parameter is pi`MU . We want to analyze the effect
of low skilled Mexican migrants on the US economy. To this end, we allow to change
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the migration flow from Mexico by changing pi`MU . In turn we show that low skilled labor
migrant from Mexico will trigger high skill labor migration. We set pi`MC = 0 and do not
allow Mexicans to migrate to Canada, because of low skilled migrant would prefer to
migrate to the US. If the US does not accept them, then Canada would not accept them
too. All other migration flow is possible, i.e we set pihi j = 1 for all i, j ∈ {M,C,U} and
pi`{i j}= 1 for i ∈ {C,U} and j ∈ {M,C,U}
When we impose these parameters to the model, Canadian high skilled workers
want to migrate to the US. In order make the initial condition as equilibrium, fixed cost of
moving from Canada to the US is set as slightly higher than wage rate difference between
the native high skilled workers in Canada and Canadian high skilled workers in the US:
MhCU = (1+ χ/100)w
h
U ∗ChCU −whC, where χ gives the percentage excess of fixed cost
from wage difference. We will take χ as 1 and 5 in our analyzes.
5.2. Simulation
As it is seen from the Table 5.1, there exists a huge income difference between Mexico
and the US for low skilled labor. This is because we do not allow them to move; hence
it is not equalized at the equilibrium. Moreover, even though compensation in the US is
higher than Canada, fixed cost comes into the play and Canadian high skilled worker does
not migrate.
In the first exercise, we consider the situation where there is no restriction on mi-
gration. On the left side of the Table 5.2 fixed cost adjusted as one percent above of the
wage gap. On the right side of the table, it is adjusted as five percent above the wage gap.
Small amount of change in fixed cost has small impact on outcome. Left panel and the
right panel are very similar. However, there is important difference between the tables:
no restriction case and initial condition.
When the restrictions on Mexicans are diminished and sufficient number of low
skilled Mexicans migrated to the US, Canadians also migrate to the US. Since they are
compliment, low skilled labor from Mexico increases the compensation rate in the US,
and Canadians are now can afford the fixed cost. Even with the high skilled migration,
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Table 5.1: Visa Policy - Initial Equilibrium
Panel A: Edowments of Countries
Canada Mexico the US
Low Skilled 0.06 0.27 0.58
High Skilled 0.06 0.06 0.42
Population 0.12 0.33 1
Capital Stock 0.10 0.14 0.94
Land 0.12 0.33 1.00
TFP 0.88 0.73 1.00
Panel B: Returns in the Equilibrium
Canada Mexico the US
Wage 0.22 0.09 0.22
Compensation 0.46 0.53 0.60
RentLand 0.03 0.01 0.03
RentCap 0.20 0.20 0.20
GDP 0.07 0.09 0.61
Table 5.2: Visa Policy - No Restriction on Labor
χ = 1% χ = 5%
Canada Mexico the US Canada Mexico US
Low Skilled 0.0589 0.0463 0.7152 0.0589 0.0463 0.7152
High Skilled 0.0591 0.0192 0.4562 0.0596 0.0192 0.4558
Population 0.1072 0.0655 1.2814 0.1185 0.0654 1.2701
Capital Stock 0.0975 0.0372 1.0491 0.0980 0.0371 1.0485
Land 0.1228 0.3313 1.0000 0.1228 0.3313 1.0000
TFP 0.8785 0.7253 1.0000 0.8785 0.7253 1.0000
χ = 1% χ = 5%
Canada Mexico the US Canada Mexico the US
Wage 0.2125 0.1250 0.2083 0.2132 0.1250 0.2083
Compensation 0.4632 0.4914 0.6143 0.4622 0.4915 0.6144
RentLand 0.0262 0.0037 0.0346 0.0264 0.0037 0.0346
RentCap 0.2052 0.2052 0.2052 0.2052 0.2052 0.2052
GDP 0.0631 0.0241 0.6867 0.0635 0.0240 0.6788
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which put downward pressure on the compensation rates, the rise in the compensation
rate is around 1.6%.
We see a significant increase in the wage rate of low skilled workers in the Mexico.
This is because the drastic shrink in the low skilled labor force there. More than 80% of
the low skilled labor in Mexico migrates to the US. Moreover, this flow cause to decline
in the wage of high skilled workers in Mexico; hence they also migrate in this scenario.
Even though the restriction in the first place does not bind them, we only see this flow after
elimination of barriers for low skilled labor. Together with these two flow of Mexicans,
this figure means that today 80% of the Mexicans wants to move to the US.
Table 5.3: Visa Policy - % Changes
χ = 1% χ = 5%
Canada Mexico the US Canada Mexico the US
Low Skilled 0.00% -82.97% 23.32% 0.00% -82.97% 23.31%
High Skilled -7.42% -67.86% 8.61% -6.65% -67.88% 8.52%
Population -3.86% -80.25% 27.06% -5.34% -72.75% 11.09%
Capital Stock -5.84% -72.74% 11.14% -3.46% -80.25% 27.01%
GDP -5.13% -72.53% 13.24% -4.62% -72.54% 11.93%
GDP per cap -1.32% 39.06% -10.88% -1.21% 39.03% -11.88%
Wage -3.43% 42.20% -6.63% -3.10% 42.16% -6.66%
Compensation 1.66% -6.88% 1.62% 1.44% -6.86% 1.65%
Ret. Land -5.13% -72.53% 11.98% -4.62% -72.54% 11.93%
Ret. Cap 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75%
Canada, on the other hand, is negatively effected from this removal of barriers. Only
positive figure for Canada is the compensation rate, due to reduction in the supply of high
skilled worker. But this has negative effect on economy with 5% shrink in GDP and 1.3$
contraction in per capita term.
Although GDP of the US increased by 12%, 23% expansion in low skilled labor
force and 11% growth in total population, lead to decrease in per capita GDP. Even though
there is a 8% augmentation in high skill work force, they come with efficiency loss, hence
overall efficiency drastically declined.
One interesting question regarding this picture is that, whether there is an optimum
restriction on Mexican low skilled movement that maximizes the welfare of the US cit-
izens. Since low skilled labor migration also induce to flow of Canadian high skilled
worker to the US, without harming the natives, is it possible to expand the output in the
economy? In order to answer this question, we gradually broaden the allowance rate of
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Figure 5.1: Movement to the US
Mexicans. For different values of pi`MU , we compute the general equilibrium and look at
the welfare in the US.
Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of the labor force in the source country that mi-
grates to the US for different level of pi`MU . In the first panel, it is seen that after around
3% of the low skilled labor from Mexico migrated, Canadian high skilled workers also
starts to migrate. When Mexico loses twenty seven percent of its low skilled labor, high
skill Mexicans also migrates to the US. This addition flow of high skilled worker de-
creases the rate of increase in the Canadian high skill labor flow.
Capital moves parallel to labor. Since capital and labor is complementary, increase
in human capital boosts the return on physical capital, hence people invest more in the
US when the labor force there enlarged. As it seen in the Figure 5.2, both capital stock
and return on capital rise. Furthermore, return on land also improves, since it is also
complementary to labor. So, capital owners in might want to reduce the restriction on the
labor movement.
Gradual expansion in labor force contribute to expansion in output. This is not
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Figure 5.2: Asset Returns
surprising since more input is used in the economy. However, per capita output depressed
with the higher low skill labor movement. This is because population increases higher
than the labor efficiency.
Since the low skilled labor enlarged with the removal of restrictions, wage rate
for them also cutback. On the other hand, the high skill labor in the US gains from this
movement. But the increase in their gain diminishes with the flow of Mexican high skilled
labor. Although there exist a decline in wage rates, rise in the return on capital and land
might eliminate this loss. However, Figure 5.5 shows that this is not the case. Total
welfare of the low skilled labor is strictly decreasing with the greater low skilled labor
movement.
To sum up, even with a slight elimination of restriction on low skilled labor from
Mexico triggers the movement of Canadian high skilled worker. The benefit for high
skilled is increasing with this flows, but low skilled labor in the US is losing.
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Figure 5.3: Return on Labor
Figure 5.4: Output
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Figure 5.5: Total Return
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The migration is an important topic in politics. While low skill migrants seems to burden
on native population, high skilled workers are important for the future prospects of the
country. Therefore, countries want to attract the brightest and most talented people around
the world.
However, the flow of one skilled group has a spillover impact on the other skilled
group’s migration. In this theses, we showed this observation holds in a general equilib-
rium model, with free capital movement and restricted labor movements. Indeed, changes
in policy related parameters in order to attract high skilled worker leads to increases in
low skilled labor migration, and vice-a-versa.
Providing language courses, giving better services to high skilled migrants are poli-
cies used in Germany in order to attract high skilled worker. This way migrants would
integrate to the labor market and the efficiency loss would lessen. This would augment
the return on migration, hence Germany would become a desired destination for skilled
labor. Though, this would stimulate the low skill labor flow since high skills increase the
wage rate for them. Even at the beginning the aim was to capture the high skilled labor,
at the end we end up with low skilled labor movement.
Changing the restrictions on the low skilled labor migration, on the other hand,
might increase the flow of high skilled labor. Because more low skilled labor cause in-
crease in compensation, with the flow of low skilled migration, educated labor also wants
to migrate.
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Our model assumes full employment, therefore we do not consider the migrants
effect on unemployment level. Also, we did not model illegal migration. However, illegal
migration is major problem between the US and Mexico. These two features might affect
the outcome of the model negatively.
In contrast, changing these parameters are costly. In order to increase the integra-
tion processes, countries need to hire more people and spend more on services. Thus,
fastening the integration process is also burden on tax payers. On the other hand, elimi-
nation of restrictions on labor movement has positive effect on government budget, since
visa granting process and border protection is costly. As a future research, the optimum
level of such policies, considering their costs, can be analyzed.
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